BY: SUN STAFF
Jan 6, CANADA (SUN) —
Tattva Sandarbha
by Srila Jiva Goswami
SECTION FORTY
In this way, by basing their ideas on Brahman and avidya alone their philosophy ends up in a contradiction, namely that the one undivided Brahman, of pure consciousness, having no contact with avidya, becomes jiva when polluted by contact with avidya. Moreover, the same Brahman is called Isvara when considered the basis of Maya, which is an imposition of the jiva out of his avidya. But the same Brahman is called jiva when within the domain of Maya, wherein the jiva becomes the subject of Isvara's Maya.
Furthermore, avidya is said to exist within pure consciousness (Brahman), to give rise to the jiva, and vidya in that part which is called Isvara, possessing a super-imposed upadhi of avidya. And, the absurdity to beat it all, the one who possesses vidya is the source of illusion. These and other such unintelligible imaginations should be investigated.
Sri Jiva Toshani Commentary
In the previous sections Srila Jiva Gosvami gave refutations to the two main theories of monism, paricchedavada and pratibimbavada. He showed that neither of these theories give a consistent explanation of the empirical world nor of the jiva's presence in it. Now he looks at the internal fallacies in the same theories. He says that even if the division of the Brahman into various jivas is accepted through either the paricchedavada or the pratibimbavada, still the contradiction between Brahman and avidya cannot be resolved.
How can a portion of Brahman, which is pure consciousness, fall into the domain of Maya and think of itself as jiva? Knowledge and delusion cannot have the same basis, just as light and darkness cannot have the same source. Besides, Brahman, being indivisible, permits no such fragmentations as to manifest jivas. Moreover, on the absolute plane no Maya or avidya is present, only Brahman. Either Brahman must degrade itself to the empirical level of Maya to be adulterated by upadhis, or Maya has to elevate herself to the absolute level to influence Brahman. No possibility of the former exists because Brahman, being devoid of attributes, cannot change itself. The latter option gives rise to dualism, because Maya and Brahman would have to stand on a common platform on the Absolute plane. This, of course, runs counter to monism.
When pressed, the impersonalists may try to console us that somehow or other the jiva is in maya and how it happened is not the vital issue. Now the house is on fire and it is not practical to search out Maya's origin; rather try to escape the fire before it devours you, meaning before you lose this human form of life.
But even if we grant that argument, they should at least first convince us that the end they want us to seek is in our interest, which they have failed to do. The house may be on fire, but it does not follow that we should panic and jump out the first available window to our certain death.
Srila Jiva Gosvami says in effect that the Mayavadis believe that after Brahman comes under the influence of avidya He is called jiva. Then this jiva creates Maya by his imagination. A portion of Brahman then gives shelter to this Maya and becomes known as Isvara, or the Lord. From then onwards Maya always follows Isvara's dictum and then influences the Maya covered Brahman, now called jiva. So Isvara is the basis of Maya and jiva is her vishaya or subject.
This is unintelligble. Their explanation is plagued with the logical defect called "anyo'nyasraya dosha", or the defect of mutual dependence: The existence of Maya is due to the jiva and that of the jiva is due to Maya. Without Maya there is no jiva and without jiva there is no Maya. Then a part of Brahman becomes Isvara by contact with Maya, but then Maya is subordinate to this Isvara. Even Isvara cannot exist without the mercy of the jiva who is further dependent on Maya. So ultimately Isvara is at the mercy of Maya.
Further, they maintain that Maya has two facets--vidya and avidya. The upadhi limiting Brahman into Isvara is the vidya part of Maya, which is abundant in the mode of goodness; and the upadhi limiting Brahman into the jiva is the avidya part of Maya. Hence, although Isvara is the embodiment of knowledge He is the basis of illusion for the jiva, thus simultaneously he becomes the support of illusion and knowledge. These are some of the absurdities resulting from the acceptance of paricchedavada or pratibimbavada.
Srila Jiva Gosvami says that other such inconsistencies should be searched out. For example, if originally there is only featureless Brahman and nothing else exists, then where does avidya come from? And, if avidya can bind Brahman, it must be more powerful than Brahman. Here Mayavadis compare Brahman to a spider that weaves its own cobweb and somehow gets bound by it, but this example would make Brahman energetic and a possessor of attributes, which plays them right back into the dualistic understanding.
Some other points are that Brahman is unlimited and devoid of any limbs or parts so it has no capacity to cast a reflection. Brahman is pure consciousness, but consciousness must have a subject different than itself. There is no meaning to knowledge without a subject. And if there is subject then there is duality of knowledge and known. Ultimately, the very fact that Brahman exists proves that it is potent, because existence of something implies energy or attributes of some sort.
From Sankhya philosophy we understand that from Pradhana comes the Mahat-tattva, which gives rise to false ego. Now even if that false ego is dissolved by practice of knowledge, as the Mayavadis claim, the other two elements of material nature--mahat-tattva and pradhana--will remain undissolved. How then will this ego-less jiva transcend the Mahat-tattva and Pradhana and realize Brahman?
In Sanskrit there is an inherent relationship between words and their meaning. This meaning can be either an object, quality, a class, or an activity. Certainly the word Brahman represents neither a class nor an activity. If Brahman means a quality, there must be an object possessing that quality, for a quality cannot stand apart from the object. And, if Brahman means an object, then it must possess qualities by its very definition. In either case Brahman becomes an object possessing qualities. In other words, one ends up with dualism.
Mayavadis explain this material world on the basis of Maya, which is neither sat (real) nor asat (unreal). They say it is inexplicable (anirvacaniya), but in the Bhagavad-gita (2.16), Lord Sri Krishna accepts only two categories, sat and asat:
"Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that the unreal (asat) has no existence, and the real (sat) has no non-existence." There is no mention here or anywhere else of an inexplicable third level. Thus the Mayavadis whole concept of Maya and the material world belonging to some inexplicable third category is a concoction.
To prove their concept of the material world being inexplicable, as not real and not unreal, they give their famous example of the rope and the snake. If the snake is completely false (asat), they say, then man will never perceive it in the rope in the semi-darkness, because a nonexistent object can never be perceived. So the snake is not completely false, but it cannot be considered real (sat) either, because in proper lighting no snake is seen. Thus there must be a third category, seperate and apart from the sat and the asat. This third category is anirvacaniya, inexplicable, which they asign to Maya.
The truth, however, is that one need not resort to the Mayavada version to explain the rope seen as a snake. The snake and the rope are both real. The person who mistakes a rope for a snake has previously experienced a real snake either by seeing or hearing and knows it is dangerous. Out of fear of snakes, therefore, when such a person sees a rope, the impression of a snake is super-imposed onto the rope. If someone has never experienced a snake in any manner whatsoever, he will never mistake a rope for a snake. A child, for example, will have no fear of a snake, what to speak of a rope in semi-darkness. Hence there is no inexplicable third category to the material world as the Mayavadis claim.
Since they accept only Brahman as the ultimate reality, Mayavadis say that even scriptures that teach statements like tat tvam asi are true on the empirical level. Although such utterances are capable of uplifting a person, they are not absolute. This is yet another incoherent aspect of their system. If the scriptures are empirical realities how can they elevate anyone beyond Maya? By this logic even the works of such liberated people as Yajnavalkya and Sankara are worthless, for not being Absolute in nature, they must be full of dualism.
In reality, the jiva is not adulterated Brahman or any similar version as the Mayavadis may claim. As stated in the Bhagavad-gita (15.7), mamaivamso jiva-loke jiva-bhutah sanatanah, "The jiva is an eternal fragment of the Lord." This entity can never lose its identity by merging into Brahman. When wheat and rice are mixed they do not merge into each other and become one. We can easily identify the wheat from the rice. If, on the other hand, papaya seeds and blackpeppercorns, which look alike, are mixed together a person may have difficulty identifying them seperately, but this does not mean they are merged and become one.
When water and milk are mixed together their identities are not lost. Rather, it is our inability to distinguish the two that makes it appear that they are merged. As molecules the milk and water have not merged and become all milk or all water. The proof is that the volume of liquid increases when one is added to the other. Indeed, even when a glass of water is poured into a pail of water they have not merged together. Again the volume of liquid has increased by one glass.
Similarly, the jiva cannot merge into Brahman and lose its identity, but if a jiva wants to feel himself as one with Brahman and performs the proper spiritual practice for this, then reluctantly the Lord, who is the fulfiller of desires, makes that jiva feel as if he has attained oneness with Him. In reality God and the jiva are always distinct and the Lord always knows this distinction.
Having established that the Mayavadi version is opposed to the trance of Vyasadeva and having highlighted some of the key defects in their logic Srila Jiva Gosvami next argues that the monistic conclusion is against the experience of Sukadeva Gosvami, the prime speaker of Srimad Bhagavatam.
Go to Section Forty-one
Return to Section Thirty-nine
