BY: SUN STAFF
Jan 3, CANADA (SUN) —
Tattva Sandarbha
by Srila Jiva Goswami
SECTION THIRTY-SEVEN
If the upadhis are considered empirical realities and not illusory, still Brahman, being beyond the scope of any divisions, cannot become divided or limited by the upadhis. Besides, Brahman, being devoid of attributes, all-pervading, and undivided, can cast no reflections. Since It is has no attributes It can have no relation with upadhis; being all-pervading, It cannot be divided into object and Its reflections; and, being undivided, It cannot be seen. The sky, not possessing any visible attributes, has no reflections. What is seen are the reflections of the limited luminous bodies in the sky.
Sri Jiva Toshani Commentary
In monism existence (satta) is explained at three different levels--pratibhasika (apparent reality), vyavaharika (empirical reality), and parmarthika (Absolute Reality). The apparent reality is that which is perceived under certain abnormal conditions, but which ceases to exist under normal or empirical conditions. One may, for example, mistake a rope for a snake in semi-darkness, but this perception ceases as soon as light is shed on the rope. Therefore, the snake perceived in the rope was an apparent reality, or pratibhasika satta. It cannot be considered an empirical reality.
The empirical reality, or vyavaharika satta, refers to our perception in daily life under the normal wakeful state. The ultimate reality, or parmarthika satta, exists in all the objects of the material world as one uniform existence. In Drig-drisya-viveka (20) Sripada Sankaracarya writes:
"Every object in the material world has five characteristics--existence, ability to be perceived, attractiveness, form, and name. Of these the first three belong to Brahman and the others to the world." The last two items, form and name, being products of Maya, constitute only the empirical reality; they do not exist on the Absolute level. They are necessary only as long as one has not realized Brahman. The other three are Brahman as perceived in empirical reality.
The parmarthika satta, or Absolute Reality, is impersonal Brahman, which, unlike the other two realities, cannot be contradicted by any experience or scriptural injunction. Just as dreams do not exist when one is awake, the material world will cease to exist when one becomes Brahman realized. Being absolute, there is no higher state above Brahman which can deny the existence of Brahman in the past, present, or future. At the Brahman level there is no distinction between knowledge, the knower, and the object of knowledge. All three fuse into the one Absolute Reality. The two lower realities, pratibhasika and vyavaharika, are not perceived at this level.
Srila Jiva Gosvami refutes both the paricchedavada and the pratibimbavada, by considering the upadhis as a feature of the two lower realities, because the upadhis can never be part of the Absolute Reality, as that would introduce duality on the non-dual plane. In the case of paricchedavada, or the theory of seperation, upadhis can be either empirical reality (anavidyaka) or apparent reality (avidyaka). Srila Jiva Gosvami considers both and shows the fallacy in them.
If the upadhis are empirically real, still Brahman, being beyond any empirical reality, cannot be limited by them. In the Bhagavad-gita (13.13) Lord Sri Krishna confirms this when He says:
"I shall now explain the knowable, knowing which you will taste the eternal. Brahman, the spirit, beginningless, and subordinate to Me, lies beyond the cause and effect of this material world." Thus no upadhis can limit Brahman.
But in the opinion of Sankaracarya, this verse says, "I shall tell you that which has to be known, knowing which one attains immortality; it is the beginningless, supreme Brahman, which is said to be neither being nor non-being". In commenting on this verse Sankara writes:
idam tu jneyam atindriyatvena sabdaika-pramanagamyatvat na ghatadivad ubhaybuddhyanu-gata pratyayavishayam iti ato na sat na asad it ucyate. yat tu uktam viruddham ucyate jnyeyam tad na sat tad na asad ucyate iti. na viruddham. "anyadeva tadviditadatho aviditadadhi" (Kena Up. 1.3) iti srute.
"But this knowable Brahman, being beyond the reach of the senses, can be understood only through revealed knowledge. Therefore, unlike the clay pot etc., it can never be said to exist or not exist, thus it can never be called sat or asat.
Objection: But you said it is to be known--then how can it not be sat or asat? This seems contradictory.
Answer: No, it is not, because Sruti states: "That (Brahman) is surely different from the known; and again, it is above the unknown"."
So according to the Mayavadis own version, Brahman is beyond sense perception, beyond empirical existence and non-existence. This being the case, the upadhis, if they are empirically real, can never limit the undivided and indivisible Brahman and produce jivas, hence the Vedas say, agrihyo na grihyate "Brahman is untouchable". (Brihad A. #.9.26) Brahman is neither pierceable nor breakable and therefore cannot be broken or limited into jivas the way one may break a big stone into pieces.
But, even if it is granted that Brahman can be divided into jivas by upadhis, then neither the jiva nor Brahman can be called eternal. But in the Bhagavat-gita, which the Mayavadis accept as authority, both jiva and Brahman are described as eternal. In Chapter Thirteen, text twenty, the lord says the jiva is "anadi", beginningless. The same is explained in verses 20 to 24 in the Second Chapter of Bhagavad-gita.
Srila Baladeva Vidyabhushana says that even if the above point is overlooked other inconsistencies abound in the Mayavada conception: The jiva and Isvara move from one place to another, but Brahman is all-pervading. Somehow a portion of Brahman becomes limited by upadhi to manifest as jiva. When the said jiva moves from one place to another, either Brahman also moves along with it or Brahman does not. But Brahman moving from place to place is not possible, because moving means leaving an earlier place of existence and going to a new place where it did not exist previously. But this is absurd, Brahman being all-pervading.
If Brahman does not move, we must assume the alternative--that while the jiva is moving from place to place, the upadhi keeps limiting a new portion of Brahman and releasing the previously limited portion from upadhi. This reduces Brahman, or Absolute Reality, to a virtual toy in the hands of the upadhi, which is absurd.
If it is then assumed that all of Brahman is grasped by the upadhi, then the problem of movement can be solved; but then there is no Brahman free from the upadhi, hence no need for the liberation of the jiva nor any need for discussion of philosophy, because all of existence would consist of the deluded Brahman and there would be no liberated domain to aspire for.
If it is countered that Brahman is not the basis for the upadhis and thus they can move independent of Brahman, this means that even at the liberated level the upadhis will not cease to exist, being of an independent nature.
The conclusion is that in paricchedavada, belief in the upadhis being empirically real is invalid.
Srila Jiva Gosvami then refutes the pratibimbavada, the theory of reflection. Brahman, he says, can have no reflection in the upadhis, or subtle bodies, because it is devoid of all attributes. Only an object which possesses attributes like form and color can have a reflection. If the object is invisible, then how can it be reflected in anything?
If it is countered that the sky, although invisible, reflects in water. Jiva Gosvami says that it is in fact the celestial bodies and not the sky, which reflects in the water. If the sky can cast a reflection then the wind must cast one also, because air is a grosser manifestation of the material elements than the sky. According to modern science the bluish background seen behind the celestial bodies is an optical illusion created by the reflacted sunlight as it passes through the atmosphere. No concrete object called sky is there to cast a reflection. Hence the analogy comparing Brahman to the sky being reflected in water is invalid.
Further, it was already shown that Brahman is beyond empirical existence and non-existence and beyond sensory perception. Subsequently, it is foolish to speculate now that Brahman reflects as jivas. Still, Srila Jiva Gosvami gives the opposition a breather and accepts their premise that Brahman can reflect in upadhis, in which case Brahman, being all-pervading, must also exists in the upadhis in which it is supposed to reflect. But if the object, Brahman, is already existing in the medium where it is supposed to cast a reflection, how will it reflect there? A mirror cannot reflect in itself, similarly Brahman cannot reflect in itself. And even if it reflects somehow, how will it be possible to distinguish the reflected Brahman from the original Brahman already present? There will be an overlapping of the two, and even if a distinction is made, what is the basis for such distinction? Why is it that the reflected Brahman will be singled out, termed as jiva and made to suffer? What is His offense? Why is it that the reflected Brahman becomes affected by the upadhi and not the original Brahman, although the reflection is just overlapping it?
Further, it is known that Brahman has no parts in it, nishkalam nishkriyam santam (Svet. 6.79), "Brahman has no limbs or parts in it; It is devoid of any activity and is peaceful". A formless, indivisible object cannot have a relation with any upadhi, real or imaginary. It cannot reflect in any medium.
To counter this the monists say that when a red flower is kept next to a crystal, the crystal appears red. Here the red color, which is formless and partless, has cast its reflection in the crystal, thus it its possible for Brahman to reflect. This is a faulty argument. The red color belongs to the flower and that flower is reflecting in the crystal, although in the crystal we see only the color of the flower. The color exists as an attribute of the flower; it cannot sustain itself independently of the flower. Further, a flower has shape and contains parts and attributes. In the end neither the color nor the flower is comparable to Brahman. As with the reflected sky comparison, this is a dissimilar example.
Moreover, Sruti says, asango hyayam purushah (Brih.Ar.U.4.3.15), "Brahman is free from any relation or association". Thus Brahman cannot strike any relation with the reflecting medium. But the Mayavadis interpret the word "asangah" to mean " devoid of real relation". This means Brahman can have non-real relations or associations, created by Maya; but we have already argued that Brahman has no qualification to have a reflection or any other relation with an empirically real medium, what to speak of a non-real relation or medium. The Prasnopanishad (4.10) confirms this when it states, tadacchayamasariramalohitam, "That Brahman casts no shadow, has no body, and is colorless". The conclusion is that whether accepted as real or unreal, the upadhis can never impose themselves on Brahman. They only affect the deluded jiva.
In the next section, Srila Jiva Gosvami, accepting the upadhis as real, gives more arguments against the Mayavada doctrine.
Go to Section Thirty-eight
Return to Section Thirty-six
